Hi Zach,
I just read this. I've been away from my desk, it being summertime and all.
Thanks for the note.
In any case, I suppose I might respond to your question by saying that Carson's claims and my claim about his claims are of a different logical order. He is saying he has the right interpretation of a set of texts, and that it is X. All I'm saying is that I also have looked at the same texts and at many different commentators and what I see is that there are many different interpretations of the very same text: not only X, but Y and Z, and A, and B, and C, and so on. By looking at the original texts and at all the different interpretations of those texts, I have to conclude that none of the interpretations convincingly argues that they have the better interpretation, using publicly accessible criteria. They might want to say
that the holy spirit has spoken to them, as Barth does, but many different interpreters make the same claim, and the very fact that the interpretations are different -- each writer insisting that he has the truth -- leads me to think that none of the interpretations comes with its own verification of truth. Appeal to the holy spirit just doesn't work -- it's like saying, I got a special link to the big guy, and you don't. And so I'm making a claim about the difficulty of interpretation of the bible, not saying that I have the right interpretation but this: that the very fact that there are many different interpretations suggests, first, that the "truth" is a very difficult thing to discern, and second, that we ought therefore to be cautious about making absolute claims. I am not insisting I know for sure what the correct interpretation of this or that doctrine is in the bible; I'm simply saying that the multiple and conflicting claims in the bible itself and the multiple interpretations of those claims strongly suggest (I would even say convince) me that while one or another interpretation "might be right," there is no way of knowing that for sure. Am I sure about that? Sure that we can't be sure about doctrine? Well, I'd say it's a matter of probability -- there is, for me, a high percentage of surety that we can't
be sure about doctrine from the study of the bible, and that probability is based on the evidence I've pointed to in this paragraph. This is a reasonable conclusion, reasonable enough to be a working hypothesis for me in my work in theology. But note, once again, my claim, my "reasonable conclusion" is about "knowledge" or lack of it is of a different logical order -- I'm offering an epistemological claim, not an ontological claim, as is Carson's claim. And Zach, this is not different that the kind of claims we are about to make in any other area of knowledge -- history, or biology, or physics, and the like. No one who has thought deeply about epistemology concludes that they have knowledge of absolute truth -- at best, we can offer epistemological claims that have a probability of truth.
Take care,
Jerry
My response:
Dr. Soneson,
You said..."that the very fact that there are many different interpretations suggests, first, that the "truth" is a very difficult thing to discern, and second, that we ought therefore to be cautious about making absolute claims. I am not insisting I know for sure what the correct interpretation of this or that doctrine is in the bible; I'm simply saying that the multiple and conflicting claims in the bible itself and the multiple interpretations of those claims strongly suggest (I would even say convince) me that while one or another interpretation "might be right," there is no way of knowing that for sure."
I agree that we must hold our views with a certain degree of humility in light of the fact that we are finite. I hope you don't hear me saying ever that I have absolute (meaning God like) knowledge of anything, but this does not mean that we are forced into agnosticism. As one of seminary profs, Dr. Michael Williams says:
"But this is the difference between certitude (the epistemic status of the object of knowing in the mind of the knower) and certainty (the givenness of the object)".
Perhaps when you say probability what you mean is what Dr. Williams might call certainty as opposed to certitude. I would assume we are both in agreement on this. Where I would challenge your rationale might be summed up best by Dr. Carson again in a chapter from a book called "Reclaiming the Center" (it is attached for your consideration if you like). On page 46 and 47 he says this:
In particular, wittingly or otherwise Grenz has bought into one of the fundamental antitheses embraced by postmodernism: either we can know something absolutely and omnisciently, or our “knowledge” of that thing is nothing more than a social construction that has the most doubtful connection with reality, i.e., with the thing-in-itself. If you think that this antithesis is a convincing analysis of the alternatives, then you will be driven to a pretty radical postmodernism, because one can always show that human beings know nothing omnisciently— so if the antithesis is reasonable, there is only one alternative left. Postmodernism is entirely right to remind us that all human knowing is necessarily the knowledge of finite beings, and is therefore in some ways partial, non-final, conditional, dependent on a specific culture (after all, language itself is a cultural artifact). But nuanced alternatives abound to the absolute antithesis so beloved of postmoderns and everywhere assumed by Grenz. Various scholars have developed the hermeneutical spiral,the pairing of “distanciation” and “fusing of horizons,” asymptotic approaches to knowledge.7 All of these have argued, convincingly and in detail, that notwithstanding the genuine gains in humility brought about by postmodernism, finite human beings may be said to know some things truly
even if nothing absolutely/omnisciently.
. . . The element of truth in this postmodern assertion, of course, is that human beings are finite, and therefore their knowledge is never absolute/final/omniscient. Moreover, all human articulation is necessarily within the bounds of some culture or other, and can thus truly be said to be a social construct. But to run from this fair observation to the insistence that it is improper to talk about objective truth, or about human knowledge of truth, is merely a reflection of being hoodwinked by that one untenable antithesis. We may not know truth with the knowledge of omniscience, and insofar as postmodernism has reminded us of this, it has debunked some of the idolatry of modernism. But that is not the same thing as saying that we can know some things truly, even if nothing omnisciently. We can know that the water molecule is made up of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, that Jesus Christ died on the cross and rose from the dead, that God is love, and countless more things. We cannot know any of them omnisciently, but we can know them truly. Think of the many things the Bible says that believers do know, know to be the truth, and are obligated to pass on to others as the truth."
Consider my 4 year old. He doesn't know nearly as much as I do about certain things, but he does know some things truly (I love him, He has a sister, he likes to play basketball, fire is hot). Surely the gap between finite knowledge and an infinite knower is much more vast than between a father and a son, but I think my point remains the same. Just because we don't have absolute knowledge (in the God sense) of something does not mean that we can't know something truly. Calvin alluded to this when we talked about Revelation as being God's "baby talk". He condescends to us in Revelation to speak to us so that He can be truly know. Not known absolutely (or we would be God) but known truly none the less. This points to a difference in our fundamental assumptions about reality. You place the human as the center of your worldview and work from there. I put an objective God (or Knower) outside of myself in the center and work out from there. This brings with it a whole set of assumptions with it. The issue of epistemology just being one of them that we are touching on here. The question might be, which is a better starting point? Which starting point makes more sense? But I guess from your worldview that is a silly question since we can't know anything for sure, we are just left with probabilities drawn from autonomous reason, wait... that was a statement about the nature of reality... uh...not sure where this leaves us...it this not absurd as it implodes on itself?
Where I differ from you is your assumption that since there are so many barriers to knowledge, nothing can actually be known.
You say that you don't know how to reconcile all the differing claims that are present in Christian circles alone, thus you conclude (according to you can I even use that word, conclude?) that we are forced to believe that none of them can be correct. But I can't get around the fact that you assume that you can place yourself as the all knowing knower and stand back and survey all the evidence and then make a claim about the nature of reality. You call this "probability". Call it probability if you like, but you are still taking a position on the nature of reality. It doesn't matter if this is 50% or 75% or 99%, it's still a position where you seem to be saying "this is THE case". You are in essence saying, "I am absolutely certain that I am basing my knowledge on what I call probability." It seems again here that you are making a definitive claim about the nature of reality, all the while claiming that this is not possible. It's nicely tucked away in your discussion of probability, but in the end it's the same thing.
You said:
"I am not insisting I know for sure what the correct interpretation of this or that doctrine is in the bible; I'm simply saying that the multiple and conflicting claims in the bible itself and the multiple interpretations of those claims strongly suggest (I would even say convince) me that while one or another interpretation "might be right," there is no way of knowing that for sure."
The bookends of this statement are very interesting to me. You begin by saying that you are "not insisting" to know for sure, but you end by saying there is "no way" of knowing for sure. Is your saying the words "no way" not a statement of surety? If you were to be consistent with your worldview I would think that you would have to rephrase that and say "according to my subjective opinion that may or may not correspond to how things actually are, there is no way of knowing that for sure"
You state:
"This is a reasonable conclusion, reasonable enough to be a working hypothesis for me in my work in theology".
But reasonable to who? Who defines what reason is anyway? Is reason the measuring stick now by which we define all acceptable knowledge? If the answer is yes, then there you have your God. But if we are all autonomous in the universe with no communication possible from outside us then reason is up for grabs. You end up with an endless cycle of "says who" statements without ever being able to land on anything ultimate. Seems like all you can really say is "this might be a reasonable conclusion".
One more question:
If we can't really make ontological claims about knowledge, but only epistemological ones, is this not an ontological claim about the nature of knowledge itself?
Sorry this is so long, but I think these matters are of utmost importance. I hope we can continue and I hope your summer is going very well! Next time I would like to discuss how the Bible talks about knowledge.
Sincerely,
zach
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